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Abstract This paper proposes a panpsychist interpretation of Anne Conway’s
(1631-1679) metaphysics, as elucidated in The Principles of the Most Ancient and
Modern Philosophy. Contemporary versions of panpsychism attempt to explain
how consciousness is realised in the natural world. They posit thatmatter is intrinsic-
ally experiential, such that when it is arranged into the formof a humanbrain, it gives
rise to human consciousness. Similarly, Conway argues that substance is consti-
tuted by both Body and Spirit. The former serves as an explanation of a substance’s
material properties, whereas the latter explains how a substance can have various
kinds of perceptual experiences, as well as experiencing sensation and emotion. I
argue that Conway uses her concept of Spirit to refer to the same set of experiential
properties as our contemporary concept of consciousness does. Understood thus,
Conway’s metaphysical framework appears to embrace a form of panpsychism.
1 Introduction
Scholarly interest in Anne Conway (1631-1679) has often directed aĴention to her ar-
guments in favour of ‘vitalism’.1 By virtue of this, philosophers have failed to notice
or, at the very least, properly account for the panpsychist elements of her only extant
work, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy.
*Andrew Fyffe is a soon-to-be graduate of the University of St Andrews. Unable to pry himself
from rural Fife, he will return to the department in September to undertake the MLiĴ in Philosophy.
His primary interests lie in the so-called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness. In particular, he wishes to
encourage scientific and philosophical investigations into consciousness which view it as a fundamental
constituent of the world around us. He is also interested in conceptual engineering, normative reasons,
and linguistic communication.
1. For example, see: Carolyn Merchant, “The Vitalism of Anne Conway: Its Impact on Leibniz’
Concept of the Monad,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 17 (1979): 255-269.
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I have two aims in this essay: one interpretative and one normative. First, I propose
an interpretation of Conway inwhich her concept of Spirit is understood as coextensive
with our contemporary concept of consciousness. This will consist of two sections:
(i) an exposition of Conway’s metaphysics of substance, and (ii) an aĴempt to show
that ‘Spirit’ and ‘consciousness’ refer to the same set of mental properties. Second,
I argue that one should adopt my interpretation, as doing so highlights the definite
correlations between Conway’s metaphysics and that of contemporary panpsychists.
This will consist of two sections: (i) an overview of contemporary panpsychism, and
(ii) an aĴempt to situate Conway’s views amidst current discussions of panpsychism.
2 Introducing: The Metaphysics of Anne Conway
In The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, Anne Conway provides
grounds for rejecting Cartesian dualism and Hobbesian materialism, whilst outlining
a metaphysics which inherits the virtues of both. In this sense, Conway provides an
intermediate between two philosophical extremes: viz. the reduction of the mental to
the physical (à la Hobbes) and the ontological separation thereof (à la Descartes).
2.1 Anne Conway’s Metaphysics of Substance
Conway’s ontology is monistic insofar as it commits her to the existence of a single
type of substance.2 Despite her adherence to monism, Conway respects the Cartesian
intuition that there is some distinction to be drawn between the mental and the phys-
ical.3 Unlike her Cartesian contemporaries, however, Conway argues that there is no
essential distinction between that substance which possesses physical properties and that
substance which possesses mental properties.4
According to her framework, a substance can instantiate properties from either
class, as substance is a coalescence of the physical (Body) and the mental (Spirit).5 For
her, the existence of mental and physical properties does not imply the existence of on-
tologically distinct mental and physical substances. Rather, it implies that mentality
and corporeality are two modes of a single substance.6
2. Peter Lopston, “Introduction,” in The Principles of the Most Ancient andModern Philosophy (Martinus
Nijhoff: London, 1982), 21.
3. The reader should note that I use ‘physical’ and ‘material’ interchangeably. Thus, physical and
material properties are the same class of properties.
4. An essential distinction is one of essence or nature, e.g. Descartes’ distinction between mental and
physical substance.
5. Anne Conway, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy (London: Martinus Nijhoff,
1982), 191.
6. This allows a substance to possess bothmental andphysical properties, as its nature is not restricted
to the instantiation of either/or.
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2.2 Conway’s Concept of Spirit
There is nothing remarkable about Conway’s discussion of Body. It shall suffice to say
that her analysis mirrors Descartes’ analysis of material substance. Simply put, Body
is that which constitutes the physical aspects of a substance. That is, the properties
of having a certain shape, breadth, and weight.7 In this sense, Body is sufficient to
metaphysically explain the physical aspects of an entity.
In Chapter VI of The Principles, Spirit is introduced to refer to that aspect of sub-
stance which allows for the instantiation of mental properties.8 Spirit is, therefore,
invoked to explain how, qua physical entity, a substance can have experiences in the
visual, auditory, tactile, gustatory and olfactory modalities; sensation and emotion.9
Conway situates Spirit alongside Body as a fundamental part of the natural world.
It constitutes one aspect of a substance’s nature and is instantiated by all entities to
varying degrees, ranging from rocks to God. As such, Conway presents us with a
picture of the natural world exhibiting a hierarchy ofmentality; with themost Spiritual
substances occupying the highest and themost Bodily occupying the lowest echelons.10
Most importantly, however, is there appears to be ‘a scale of gradual shading’ from the
top to the boĴom. Such that, regardless of the tier they occupy, all created substance
is both mental and physical.11
2.3 The Interconvertible Nature of Spirit and Body
Another curious feature of Conway’s metaphysics is the convertibility of Body and
Spirit. God, qua infinitely Spiritual substance, has the power to alter the nature of par-
ticular substances. That is to say that God is responsible for conferring greater or lesser
degrees of Body and Spirit onto each individual substance. And because Conway
equates Spirit with perfection (i.e. Godliness), the more a substance ameliorates itself
(e.g. morally), the greater the degree of Spirit God allows it to possess. Consequently,
the further a substance moves away from God, the more corporeal it becomes.12
It is in this sense that created substances can be transformed (or can evolve) into
different species of substance; realise greater or lesser degrees of mentality; and move
further up the Spiritual hierarchy.13 Such that, by divine contrivance, dust can become
plants, plants can become dogs, dogs can become chimpanzees, and chimpanzees can
become humans.14
7. Conway, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, 224-5.
8. Ibid, 180-81.
9. Ibid.
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2.4 The Key Features of Conway’s Metaphysics
Firstly, Conway argues that there is only one type of substance, constituted by Body as
well as Spirit. Secondly, where Body accounts for material properties, Spirit accounts
for mental properties. Thirdly, Spirit is instantiated by all substances to varying de-
grees, thereby reflecting the difference in mental complexity across the natural world.
Fourthly, through the will of God and in accordance with their moral conduct, sub-
stances can becomemorementally complex by virtue of howmuch Spirit they possess.
3 The Coextension of ‘Spirit’ and ‘Consciousness’
I will now proceed to show that Anne Conway’s concept of Spirit and our contempor-
ary concept of consciousness are coextensive. In other words, they are both used to
denote the same set of mental properties.
3.1 Introducing: Phenomenal Consciousness
‘Consciousness’ herein refers to phenomenal consciousness.15 Simply put, phenom-
enal consciousness is experience. To say that an entity is phenomenally conscious is to
say that there is something that it is like to be that entity; that it has subjective experience.
In this sense, phenomenal properties are experiential properties.16
Conscious states are a class ofmental phenomena such as seeing the colour bluewhich
have a distinct subjective feel. What it is like to be in a conscious state (that is, the sub-
jective feel of the state) is determined by the set of experiential properties constitutive
of that state.17 For instance, feeling a sharp jolt of pain in your left leg feels a certain
way; similar in nature yet phenomenally distinct from having toothache. On my ac-
count, conscious states just are experiential states. These states are individuated by
their associated experiential properties. The totality of which determines what it is
like for a subject to be in that state.
3.2 Taxonomy of Experiential Properties
From the recent literature, we can provide a coarse-grained taxonomy of experiential
properties, including:
15. ‘Consciousness’ and ‘experientiality’ (and their associated properties/states) denote the same phe-
nomena.
16. Ned Block, “On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness,” Behavioural and Brain Sciences 18
(1995): 230-31.
17. Thomas Nagel, “What is it Like to be a Bat?” in Mortal Questions (Cambridge University Press,
1979b), 166.
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1. The various kinds of perceptual experience; such as seeing a red flower, hearing
Frank Zappa’s “Peaches en Regalia”, touching a soft surface; and so on.
2. Bodily sensation; such as feeling dehydrated or cold.
3. Feelings of emotion; such as love, fear, desire, and regret.
4. Moods; such as happiness, sadness or boredom.18 19
3.3 Textual Evidence for Coextension
Conway criticises Hobbes for thinking that an analysis of substance is exhausted by
an analysis of extension. In doing so, one reduces material entities to ‘mere Fabrick
or dead MaĴer’.20 Something was amiss in Hobbesian materialism – the absence of
which rendered substance unfeeling and unthinking. And, although Conway does
not use the term ‘consciousness’ in the Principles, it is clear that her concept of Spirit is
referring to that class of experiential properties which Hobbesian materialism fails to
account for.
For example, in Chapter IX of The Principles, Conway claims Spirit is that which
gives substance the capacity for: ‘Feeling, Sense, and Knowledge, Love, and Joy’.21 In
otherwords, the instantiation of Spirit allows for – or, at the very least, provides the po-
tential for - a substance to undergo certain perceptual experiences (‘Sense’), sensations
(‘Feeling’), emotions (‘Love’), and moods (‘Joy’).22
3.4 Why Accept My Interpretation?
It appears that the properties of Spirit are experiential in the same sense that the prop-
erties of consciousness are experiential. States of love and joy, feelings and sensations,
are all experiential states instantiated by conscious entities. And it is only by virtue of
possessing Spirit that a substance can undergo these states. Conway therefore appears
to be developing a theory concerned with the same mental phenomena as contempor-
ary theories of consciousness.
18. David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (Oxford University Press, 1996), 1-6. Michael Tye, “Philo-
sophical Problems of Consciousness,” in Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, ed. Velmans et al. (Ox-
ford: Blackwell, 2006), 23.
19. This list is amenable to the narrow interpretative focus of this paper, not to substantive discussions
of consciousness. As such, I do not take this taxonomy to be exhaustive. Thanks to the anonymous
reviewer who emphasised this point.
20. Conway, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, 180.
21. Ibid, p.225.
22. One sympathetic to the so-called ‘knowledge argument’ against materialismmaywish to correlate
Conway’s ‘Knowledge’with the type of phenomenal knowledge discussed in: Frank Jackson, “Epiphen-
omenal Qualia.”
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Perhaps this common explanandum has eschewed scholarly acknowledgement due
to Conway’s use of ‘Spirit’ in lieu of ‘consciousness’. Nevertheless, that Conway was
concerned with consciousness is noted by her Early Modern contemporary and philo-
sophic admirer, GoĴfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). In a leĴer dated 1697, Leibniz
writes: ‘My philosophical views approach somewhat closely those of the late Countess
of Conway [. . . ] because I hold that [. . . ] everything takes place according to a living
principle and according to final causes - all things are full of life and consciousness.’23
Therefore, given the sufficient textual evidence to substantiate my interpretation
and the distinct lack of aĴention paid to the preceding considerations, one should read
‘Spirit’ as ‘consciousness’. What’s more, such an interpretation illuminates another
underappreciated facet of Conway’s metaphysics. Namely, the correlations it has with
contemporary panpsychist theories of consciousness. Thus interpreted, Conway is un-
derstood as arguing for the view, as Leibniz put it, that all things are full of conscious-
ness.
4 Introducing: Contemporary Panpsychism
Much like Conway’s monism, contemporary panpsychism can be seen as an interme-
diary between reductive materialism and dualism. In fine, it is an aĴempt to explain
how consciousness is realised in the natural world, whilst assuming the phenomenon
to be irreducibly mental and ubiquitous throughout nature.24
4.1 The Intrinsic Nature of Matter
The general panpsychist commitment is that the basic constituents of the physical
world such as atoms and quarks possess experiential properties as well as physical
properties.25 MaĴer, according to panpsychism, is intrinsically mental. Thus, when
it is arranged into different kinds of organisms with different kinds of neurological
structures, the basic experiential properties combine to realise different kinds of con-
sciousness.26 For example, when these basic constituents are arranged in the form of a
human brain, the combination of their experiential properties gives rise to human con-
sciousness. Panpsychism therefore posits that: (i) all physical entities possess some
degree of consciousness by virtue of maĴer’s intrinsic experientiality, and (ii) this ex-
plains how consciousness is realised in the physical world.
23. GoĴfriedWilhelm Leibniz, leĴer to Thomas BurneĴ, 1697, in Philosophischen Schriften, ed. Gerhardt
(Hildesheim: Olms, 1960). [Italics are my own.]
24. William Seager, “Panpsychism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, ed. McLaughlin et
al. (Oxford University Press, 2009), 207.
25. Thomas Nagel, ‘Panpsychism’, inMortal Questions (Cambridge University Press, 1979a), 181.
26. Ibid, 182.
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4.2 Degrees of Experientiality
It must be stressed, however, that panpsychists are in no way commiĴed to the claim
that all substances instantiate full-blown phenomenal consciousness.27 A panpsychist
needn’t claim, for example, that a rock possesses the hallmark features of mentality.
As Chalmers notes, resistance to panpsychism tends to arise from a tacit conflation
of experiential properties with other features of mentality. Most of which require a
greater degree of material complexity for their instantiation.28
To say that a rock possesses some form of experientiality is not to imply that it
will have a rich mental life. It won’t, for instance, have a sense of selĢood, possess
memories, or have the capacity to think and reason as intelligent creatures do. Rather,
panpsychists merely affirm that everything which is physical possesses experiential
properties. Which, when constitutive of a plant, dog, or a human, realise what it is like
to be that particular substance.29
5 Anne Conway: The Panpsychist Interpretation
5.1 Matter as Intrinsically Mental
Conway’s monistic substance is jointly constituted by physical and experiential prop-
erties. She writes in Chapter VI of the Principles that: ‘. . . indeed every Body is a Spirit,
and nothing else, neither differs any thing from a Spirit [. . . ] so that this distinction
is only modal and gradual, not essential or substantial.’30 In this sense, material sub-
stances are numerically identical tomental substances; they are one and the same thing.
Like Conway, panpsychists advocate a form of monism: viz. materialism (or phys-
icalism). On this account, maĴer is posited as the basic constituent of the naturalworld.
Furthermore, panpsychists make no essential distinction betweenmental andmaterial
substance. Consequently, all substances possess both experiential and physical prop-
erties. On their analysis, maĴer is intrinsically experiential; so that, by virtue of the
nature of maĴer, all substances are constituted by basic experiential properties.
Strawson, a contemporary advocate of panpsychism, notes that one is led to the
view through accepting three propositions: (a) maĴer is a phenomenon which exists
in the natural world; (b) consciousness is a phenomenon which exists in the natural
world; and (c) there is only one type of thing in the world.31 If one accepts these claims,
27. David Chalmers, “Panpsychism and Protopsychism,” in Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives,
ed. Bruntrup et al. (Oxford University Press, 2016), 19.
28. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 295.
29. Ibid.
30. Conway, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, 190.
31. Galen Strawson, ‘Realistic Monism’, in Consciousness and its Place in Nature, ed. Freeman (Exeter:
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then one is naturally led to the conclusion that whatever constitutes substance must be
both physical and mental (in the sense of instantiating experiential properties).
In Chapter XI of The Principles, Conway writes that the Cartesian and Hobbesian
analysis ofmaĴer in purely physical terms: ‘. . .profits nothing [. . . ] for they have never
proceededbeyond theHusk of the Shell, not reached theKernel.’32 In otherwords, they
have, in their respectiveways, failed to notice that since theworld ismonistic, and since
both maĴer and consciousness are real phenomena, whatever constitutes the world
must be both physical and experiential. Moreover, Conway asserts in Chapter VII that:
‘. . . every Body is a certain Spirit or Life in its ownNature, and that the same is a certain
Spirit in its own nature [. . . ] having Knowledge, Sense, Love, Desire, Joy, and Grief.’33
Hence, like the panpsychists, Conway views the mental andmaterial as constitutive of
amonistic substance, and accounts for the former through the intrinsically experiential
nature of the laĴer.
5.2 Hierarchy of Mentality
For Conway, the hierarchy of mentality is determined by the degree to which a sub-
stance instantiates Spirit (which I have argued should be understood as coextensive
with ‘consciousness’). AdmiĴedly, Conway’s story has more theological implications
thanmost contemporary panpsychists would admit. Nevertheless, the moral remains:
the basic constituents of the world possess some degree of experientiality, with a
greater degree of experientiality being instantiated the further up the hierarchy one
inspects. In fine, the more Spirit instantiated, the greater mental complexity realised.
Chalmers’ discussion of panpsychism seems to suggest a similar continuum of con-
sciousness throughout the natural world.34 He claims that experiential properties are
instantiated by all entities, with the combination of these properties realising their
most complex instantiation in human minds. In other words, degrees of phenomenal
consciousness are realised even by the most unthinking substances (e.g. thermostats,
rocks, tables, etc.). And, by virtue of their experiential properties, there is something it
is like to be those entities.
6 Conclusion
In short, I have shown that Anne Conway can be interpreted in such a way that she
is implicitly arguing for panpsychism: the view that all substances in the world are
Imprint Academic, 2006), 7.
32. Conway, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, 225.
33. Conway, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, 191.
34. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 293-7.
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intrinsically mental. This was illustrated by showing that Conway’s concept of Spirit
denotes the same experiential properties as our contemporary concept of conscious-
ness, and by tracing the similarities between her analysis of substance alongside con-
temporary panpsychists’ analysis of maĴer.
This interpretation, I hope, will allow for a dual-appreciation of Conway qua sub-
ject of scholarly investigation, and Conway qua panpsychist with noteworthy ideas
pertaining to the metaphysics of mind.
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